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Abstract
We present a cryptographically sound security proof of the well-known Needham-
Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol for entity authentication. This protocol was previously
only proved over unfounded abstractions from cryptography. We show that it is secure
against arbitrary active attacks if it is implemented using standard provably secure cryp-
tographic primitives. Nevertheless, our proof does not have to deal with the probabilistic
aspects of cryptography and is hence in the scope of current automated proof tools. We
achieve this by exploiting a recently proposed Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library with
a provably secure cryptographic implementation. Besides establishing the cryptographic
security of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol, our result exemplifies the potential of
this cryptographic library and paves the way for the cryptographically sound verification of
security protocols by automated proof tools.
1 Introduction
Cryptographic protocols for authentication and key establishment are an established technology.
Nevertheless, most new networking and messaging stacks come with new protocols for such
tasks. As the design of cryptographic protocols is very error-prone, the demand for rigorous
proofs has been rising.
One way to conduct such proofs is the cryptographic approach. Its security definitions
are based on complexity theory, e.g., [45, 43, 34]. The security of a cryptographic protocol is
proved by reduction, i.e., by showing that breaking the protocol implies breaking one of the
underlying cryptographic primitives with respect to its cryptographic definition and thus finally
a computational assumption such as the hardness of integer factoring. This approach captures
a very comprehensive adversary model and allows for mathematically rigorous proofs. However,
because of probabilism and computational restrictions, these proofs have to be done by hand
so far, which often yields proofs with faults or gaps. Moreover, such proofs rapidly become too
complex for larger protocols.
∗Parts of this work were published in [16] and [19].
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The alternative is the formal-methods approach, which is concerned with the automation
of proofs using model checkers and theorem provers. As these tools currently cannot deal with
cryptographic details like error probabilities and computational restrictions, abstractions of
cryptography are used.1 They are almost always based on the so-called Dolev-Yao model [41],
which represents cryptography as term algebras. The original Dolev-Yao model was extended
in many papers, e.g., [42, 63]. The use of term algebras simplifies proofs of larger protocols
considerably and led to a large body of literature on analyzing protocol security using various
techniques for formal verification, e.g., [66, 61, 50, 35, 70, 1].
A prominent example of the usefulness of the formal-methods approach is Lowe’s discovery
of a man-in-the-middle attack on the well-known Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication
protocol [69, 53]. Lowe later proposed a repaired version of the protocol [54] and used the model
checker FDR to prove that this modified protocol (henceforth known as the Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe protocol) is secure in the Dolev-Yao model. The original and the repaired Needham-
Schroeder public-key protocols are two of the most often investigated security protocols, e.g., [75,
62, 74, 76]. Various new approaches and proof tools for the analysis of security protocols were
validated by rediscovering the known flaw or proving the fixed protocol in the Dolev-Yao model.
It is well-known and easy to show that the security flaw of the original protocol in the Dolev-
Yao model can be used to mount a successful attack against any cryptographic implementation
of the protocol. However, all previous security proofs of the repaired protocol are in the Dolev-
Yao model, and no theorem carried these results over to the cryptographic approach with its
much more comprehensive adversary. We close this gap, i.e., we show that the Needham-
Schroeder-Lowe protocol is secure in the cryptographic approach. More precisely, we show that
it is secure against arbitrary active attacks, including arbitrary concurrent protocol runs and
arbitrary manipulation of bitstrings within polynomial time. The underlying assumption is
that the Dolev-Yao-style abstraction of public-key encryption is implemented using a chosen-
ciphertext secure public-key encryption scheme with small additions like ciphertext tagging.
Chosen-ciphertext security was introduced in [73] and formulated as IND-CCA2 in [33]. Efficient
encryption systems secure in this sense exist under reasonable assumptions [39].
Our proof relies on a recent general result that a so-called ideal cryptographic library, which
implements a slightly extended Dolev-Yao model, can be securely realized by a specific crypto-
graphic implementation. A composition theorem for the underlying security notion implies that
protocol proofs can be made using the ideal library, and security then carries over automatically
to the cryptographic realization. However, because of the extension to the Dolev-Yao model, no
prior formal-methods proof carries over directly. Our paper therefore validates this approach
by the first protocol proof over the new ideal library (i.e., the extended Dolev-Yao model),
and cryptographic security follows as a corollary. Besides its value for the Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe protocol, the proof shows that in spite of the extensions and differences in presentation
with respect to prior Dolev-Yao models, a proof can be made over the new library that seems
easily accessible to current automated proof tools. In particular, the proof contains neither
probabilism nor computational restrictions.
1.1 Related Work
Concurrently to this work, Warinschi also gave a cryptographically sound security proof for the
Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol [77]. This proof is done from scratch in the cryptographic
approach. Hence even if it had preceded ours, we would be giving the first example of a
1Efforts exist to formulate syntactic calculi for dealing with probabilism and polynomial-time considerations,
in particular [67, 68, 48]. However, this approach cannot handle protocols with any degree of automation yet.
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cryptographically sound proof of a cryptographic protocol via a deterministic, Dolev-Yao-style
idealization of cryptography. On the other hand, Warinschi proves stronger properties; we
discuss this in Section 4. He further shows that chosen-plaintext-secure encryption is insufficient
for the security of the protocol.
Work on justifying Dolev-Yao-style models under cryptographic definitions prior to [25] was
restricted to passive adversaries and symmetric encryption [3, 2, 51]. Concurrently to [25], an
extension to asymmetric encryption, but still under passive attacks only, was presented in [47].
The underlying masters thesis [46] considers asymmetric encryption under active attacks, but in
the random oracle model, which is itself an idealization of cryptography and not justifiable [38].
The recent work [65] gives a slightly more efficient implementation of asymmetric encryption
than [25] (no additional tagging and randomization) at the cost of a much less general library
and a weaker security notion – the outlook in [65] would essentially give [25] again. Since the
original publication of our results in [16], computational soundness has become a highly active
line of research, see, e.g., line of research, see e.g., [4, 26, 13, 31, 28, 20, 22, 8, 14].
The security notion used for the relation between the ideal Dolev-Yao-style library and
its cryptographic implementation, reactive simulatability, and its composition properties were
introduced in [71] and extended to asynchronous systems in [72, 37, 29, 27]. It extends the
security notions of multi-party (one-step) function evaluation [78, 43, 44, 64, 32, 36] and the
observational equivalence of [52]. One of the overarching goals of the reactive notions was to
offer composable security guarantees, which constitutes a long-standing open problem for many
security notions in the present and past, see, e.g., [57, 49, 58, 59, 60, 56, 40, 17, 24, 18, 30, 5,
10, 28, 9, 21, 11]). There are multiple possible layers of sound abstraction from cryptography
in the sense of reactive simulatability besides Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic libraries. They
reach from low-level idealizations that still have real cryptographic in- and outputs to high-
level abstractions like secure channels. The specific aspects of a Dolev-Yao-style abstraction are
simple operator-tree abstractions from nested cryptographic terms, the restriction of adversary
capabilities to algebraic operations on such terms, and the assumption that terms whose equality
cannot be derived explicitly are always unequal.
While certainly no full Dolev-Yao model would be needed to model just the Needham-
Schroeder-Lowe protocol, there was no prior attempt to prove this or a similar cryptographic
protocol based on a sound abstraction from cryptography in a way accessible to automated
proof tools.
2 The Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Protocol
The original Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol and Lowe’s variant consist of seven steps.
Four steps deal with key generation and public-key distribution. They are usually omitted
in a security analysis, and it is simply assumed that keys have already been generated and
distributed. We do this as well to keep the proof short. However, the underlying cryptographic
library offers commands for modeling these steps as well. The main part of the Needham-
Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol consists of the following three steps, expressed in the typical
protocol notation, as in, e.g., [53].
1. u→ v : Epkv(Nu, u)
2. v → u : Epku(Nu, Nv , v)
3. u→ v : Epkv(Nv).
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Here, user u seeks to establish a session with user v. He generates a nonce Nu and sends it
to v together with hisidentity, encrypted with v’s public key (first message). Upon receiving
this message, v decrypts it to obtain the nonce Nu. Then v generates a new nonce Nv and
sends both nonces and her identity back to u, encrypted with u’s public key (second message).
Upon receiving this message, u decrypts it and tests whether the contained identity v equals
the sender of the message and whether u earlier sent the first contained nonce to user v. If yes,
u sends the second nonce back to v, encrypted with v’s public key (third message). Finally, v
decrypts this message; and if v had earlier sent the contained nonce to u, then v believes to
speak with u.
3 The Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Protocol Using the Dolev-
Yao-style Cryptographic Library
Almost all formal proof techniques for protocols such as Needham-Schroeder-Lowe first need a
reformulation of the protocol into a more detailed version than the three steps above. These
details include necessary tests on received messages, the types and generation rules for values like
u and Nu, and a surrounding framework specifying the number of participants, the possibilities
of multiple protocol runs, and the adversary capabilities. The same is true when using the
Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library from [25], i.e., it plays a similar role in our proof as “the
CSP Dolev-Yao model” or “the inductive-approach Dolev-Yao model” in other proofs. Our
protocol formulation in this framework is given in Algorithms 1 and 2.2 We first explain this
formulation, and then explain general aspects of the surrounding framework as far as needed
in our proofs.
3.1 Detailed Protocol Descriptions
We write “:=” for deterministic and “←” for probabilistic assignment, and ↓ is an error element
available as an addition to the domains and ranges of all functions and algorithms. The frame-
work is automata-based, i.e., protocols are executed by interacting machines, and event-based,
i.e., machines react on received inputs. By MNSi we denote the Needham-Schroeder machine for
a participant i; it can act in the roles of both u and v above.
The first type of input that MNSi can receive is a start message (new prot, v) from its user
denoting that it should start a protocol run with user v. The number of users is called n. User
inputs are distinguished from network inputs by arriving at a so-called port EA inu?. The “?”
for input ports follows the CSP convention, and “EA” stands for entity authentication because
the user interface is the same for all entity authentication protocols. The reaction on this input,
i.e., the sending of the first message, is described in Algorithm 1.
The command gen nonce generates the nonce. MNSu adds the result n
hnd
u to a set Nonceu,v for
future comparison. The command store inputs arbitrary application data into the cryptographic
library, here the user identity u. The command list forms a list and encrypt is encryption. The
final command send i means that MNSu attempts to send the resulting term to v over an insecure
channel. The superscript hnd on most parameters denotes that these are so-called handles, i.e.,
local names that this machine has for the corresponding terms. This is an important aspect
of [25] because it allows the same protocol description to be implemented once with Dolev-
Yao-style idealized cryptography and once with real cryptography. More precisely, the five
2For some frameworks there are compilers to generate these detailed protocol descriptions, e.g., [55]. This
should be possible for this framework in a similar way.
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Algorithm 1 Evaluation of User Inputs in MNSu
Input: (new prot, v) at EA inu? with v ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {u}.
1: nhndu ← gen nonce().
2: Nonceu,v := Nonceu,v ∪ {n
hnd
u }.
3: uhnd ← store(u).
4: lhnd1 ← list(n
hnd
u , u
hnd).
5: chnd1 ← encrypt(pke
hnd
v,u , l
hnd
1 ).
6: mhnd1 ← list(c
hnd
1 ).
7: send i(v,mhnd1 ).
commands we saw so far and their input and output domains belong to the interface (in the
same sense as, e.g., a Java interface) of the underlying cryptographic library. This interface is
implemented by both the idealized and the real version. In the first case, the handles are local
names of Dolev-Yao-style terms, in the second case of real cryptographic bitstrings. We say
more about these two implementations below. The effect of send i in the ideal implementation
is that the adversary obtains a handle to the Dolev-Yao-style term and can decide what to do
with it (such as forwarding it to MNSv or performing Dolev-Yao-style algebraic operations on
the term); the effect in the real implementation is that the adversary obtains the real bitstring
and can perform arbitrary bit manipulations on it. The list operation directly before sending
is a technicality: only lists are allowed to be sent in this library because the list operation
concentrates verifications that no secret items are put into messages.
The behavior of the Needham-Schroeder machine of participant u upon receiving a network
input is defined similarly in Algorithm 2. The input arrives at port outu? and is of the form
(v, u, i,mhnd) where v is the supposed sender, i denotes that the channel is insecure, and mhnd
is a handle to a list. The port outu? is connected to the cryptographic library, whose two
implementations represent the obtained Dolev-Yao-style term or real bitstring, respectively, to
the protocol in a unified way by a handle.
In this algorithm, the protocol machine first decrypts the list content using its secret key;
this yields a handle lhnd to an inner list. This list is parsed into at most three components
using the command list proj. If the list has two elements, i.e., it could correspond to the first
message of the protocol, and if it contains the correct identity, the machine generates a new
nonce and stores its handle in the set Nonceu,v. Then it builds up a new list according to the
protocol description, encrypts it and sends it to user v. If the list has three elements, i.e., it
could correspond to the second message of the protocol, the machine tests whether the third
list element equals v and the first list element is contained in the set Nonceu,v. If one of these
tests does not succeed, MNSu aborts. Otherwise, it again builds up a term according to the
protocol description and sends it to user v. Finally, if the list has only one element, i.e., it could
correspond to the third message of the protocol, the machine tests if the handle of this element
is contained in Nonceu,v. If so, M
NS
u outputs (ok, v) at EA outu !. This signals to user u that the
protocol with user v has terminated successfully, i.e., u believes to speak with v.
Both algorithms should immediately abort the handling of the current input if a crypto-
graphic command does not yield the desired result, e.g., if a decryption fails. For readability
we omitted this in the algorithm descriptions; instead we impose the following convention on
both algorithms.
Convention 1 If MNSu receives ↓ as the answer of the cryptographic library to a command,
then MNSu aborts the execution of the current algorithm, except for the command types list proj
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Algorithm 2 Evaluation of Network Inputs in MNSu
Input: (v, u, i,mhnd) at outu? with v ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {u}.
1: chnd ← list proj(mhnd, 1)
2: lhnd ← decrypt(skehndu , c
hnd)
3: xhndi ← list proj(l
hnd, i) for i = 1, 2, 3.
4: if xhnd1 6= ↓ ∧ x
hnd
2 6= ↓ ∧ x
hnd
3 = ↓ then {First Message is input}
5: x2 ← retrieve(x
hnd
2 ).
6: if x2 6= v then
7: Abort
8: end if
9: nhndu ← gen nonce().
10: Nonceu,v := Nonceu,v ∪ {n
hnd
u }.
11: uhnd ← store(u).
12: lhnd2 ← list(x
hnd
1 , n
hnd
u , u
hnd).
13: chnd2 ← encrypt(pke
hnd
v,u , l
hnd
2 ).
14: mhnd2 ← list(c
hnd
2 ).
15: send i(v,mhnd2 ).
16: else if xhnd1 6= ↓ ∧ x
hnd
2 6= ↓ ∧ x
hnd
3 6= ↓ then {Second Message is input}
17: x3 ← retrieve(x
hnd
3 ).
18: if x3 6= v ∨ x
hnd
1 6∈ Nonceu,v then
19: Abort
20: end if
21: lhnd3 ← list(x
hnd
2 ).
22: chnd3 ← encrypt(pke
hnd
v,u , l
hnd
3 ).
23: mhnd3 ← list(c
hnd
3 ).
24: send i(v,mhnd3 ).
25: else if xhnd1 ∈ Nonceu,v ∧ x
hnd
2 = x
hnd
3 = ↓ then {Third Message is input}
26: Output (ok, v) at EA outu !.
27: end if
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Figure 1: Overview of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Ideal System
or send i.
We refer to Step i of Algorithm j as Step j.i.
3.2 Initial State
We have assumed in the algorithms that each Needham-Schroeder machine MNSu already has a
handle skehndu to its own secret encryption key and handles pke
hnd
v,u to the corresponding public
keys of every participant v. The cryptographic library can also represent key generation and
distribution by normal commands. Further, each machineMNSu contains the bitstring u denoting
its identity, and the family (Nonceu,v)v∈{1,...,n} of initially empty sets of (nonce) handles.
3.3 Overall Framework and Adversary Model
The framework that determines how machines such as our Needham-Schroeder machines and
the machines of the idealized or real cryptographic library execute is taken from [72]. The basis
is an asynchronous probabilistic execution model with distributed scheduling. We already used
implicitly above that for term construction and parsing commands to the cryptographic library,
so-called local scheduling is defined, i.e., a result is returned immediately. The idealized or real
network sending via this library, however, is scheduled by the adversary.
When protocol machines such as MNSu for certain users u ∈ {1, . . . , n} are defined, there is
no guarantee that all these machines are correct. A trust model determines for what subsets
H of {1, . . . , n} we want to guarantee anything; in our case this is essentially for all subsets:
We aim at entity authentication between u and v whenever u, v ∈ H and thus whenever MNSu
and MNSv are correct. Incorrect machines disappear and are replaced by the adversary. Each
set of potential correct machines together with its user interface is called a structure, and the
set of these structures is called the system. When considering the security of a structure, an
arbitrary probabilistic machine H is connected to the user interface to represent all users, and
an arbitrary machine A is connected to the remaining free ports (typically the network) and
to H to represent the adversary, see Fig. 1. In polynomial-time security proofs, H and A are
polynomial-time.
This setting implies that any number of concurrent protocol runs with both honest partic-
ipants and the adversary are considered because H and A can arbitrarily interleave protocol
start inputs (new prot, v) with the delivery of network messages.
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For a set H of honest participants, the user interface of the ideal and real cryptographic
library is the port set S cryH := {inu?, outu ! | u ∈ H}. This is where the Needham-Schroeder
machines input their cryptographic commands and obtain results and received messages. In
the ideal case this interface is served by just one machine THH called trusted host which
essentially administrates Dolev-Yao-style terms under the handles. In the real case, the same
interface is served by a set Mˆ cryH := {M
cry
u,H | u ∈ H} of real cryptographic machines. The
corresponding systems are called Syscry,id := {({THH},S
cry
H ) | H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}} and Sys
cry,real :=
{(Mˆ cryH ,S
cry
H ) | H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}}.
The user interface of the Needham-Schroeder machines or any other entity authentication
protocol is SEAH := {EA inu?,EA outu ! | u ∈ H}. The ideal and real Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe systems serving this interface differ only in the cryptographic library. With Mˆ NSH :=
{MNSu | u ∈ H}, they are Sys
NS,id := {(Mˆ NSH ∪ {THH},S
EA
H ) | H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}} and Sys
NS,real :=
{(Mˆ NSH ∪ Mˆ
cry
H ,S
EA
H ) | H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}}.
3.4 On Polynomial Runtime
In order to be valid users of the real cryptographic library, the machines MNSu have to be
polynomial-time. We therefore define that each machine MNSu maintains explicit polynomial
bounds on the accepted message lengths and the number of inputs accepted at each port. As
this is done exactly as in the cryptographic library, we omit the rigorous write-up.
4 The Security Property
Our security property states that an honest participant v only successfully terminates a protocol
with an honest participant u if u has indeed started a protocol with v, i.e., an output (ok, u)
at EA outv ! can only happen if there was a prior input (new prot, v) at EA inu?. This property
and also the actual protocol does not consider replay attacks, i.e., a user v could successfully
terminate a protocol with u multiple times while ustarted a protocol with v only once. However,
this can easily be avoided as follows: If MNSu receives a message from v containing one of its
own nonces, it additionally removes this nonce from the corresponding set, i.e., it removes
xhnd1 from Nonceu,v after Steps 2.20 and 2.25. Proving freshness given this change and mutual
authentication is useful future work, but better done once the proof has been automated.
Warinschi proves these properties [77]. The even stronger property of matching conversations
from [34] that he also proves makes constraints on events within the system, not only at the
interface. We thus regard it as an overspecification in an approach based on abstraction.
Integrity properties in the underlying model are formally sets of traces at the user interfaces
of a system, i.e., here at the port sets SEAH . Intuitively, an integrity property Req contains the
“good” traces at these ports. A trace is a sequence of sets of events. We write an event p?m
or p!m, meaning that message m occurs at in- or output port p. The t-th step of a trace r is
written rt; we speak of the step at time t. The integrity requirement Req
EA for the Needham-
Schroeder-Lowe protocol is defined as follows, meaning that if v believes to speak with u at
time t1, then there exists a past time t0 where u started a protocol with v:
Definition 4.1 (Entity Authentication Requirement) A trace r is contained in ReqEA if for all
u, v ∈ H:
∃t1 ∈ N : EA outv !(ok, u) ∈ rt1
⇒ ∃t0 < t1 : EA inu?(new prot, v) ∈ rt0 .
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✸The notion of a system Sys fulfilling an integrity property Req essentially comes in two fla-
vors [12]. Perfect fulfillment, Sys |=perf Req , means that the integrity property holds for all
traces arising in runs of Sys (a well-defined notion from the underlying model [72]). Computa-
tional fulfillment, Sys |=poly Req , means that the property only holds for polynomially bounded
users and adversaries, and that a negligible error probability is permitted. Perfect fulfillment
implies computational fulfillment.
The following theorem captures the security of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol; we
prove it in the rest of the paper.
Theorem 4.1 (Security of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Protocol) For the Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe systems from Section 3.3 and the integrity property of Definition 4.1, we have
SysNS,id |=perf ReqEA and SysNS,real |=poly ReqEA. ✷
5 Proof of the Cryptographic Realization from the Idealization
As discussed in the introduction, the idea of our approach is to prove Theorem 4.1 for the
protocol using the ideal Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library. Then the result for the real
system follows automatically. As this paper is the first instantiation of this argument, we
describe it in detail.
The notion that a system Sys1 securely implements another system Sys2 reactive simulata-
bility (recall the introduction), is written Sys1 ≥
poly
sec Sys2 (in the computational case). The
main result of [25] is therefore
Syscry,real ≥polysec Sys
cry,id. (1)
Since SysNS,real and SysNS,id are compositions of the same protocol with Syscry,real and Syscry,id,
respectively, the composition theorem of [72] and (1) imply
SysNS,real ≥polysec Sys
NS,id. (2)
Showing the theorem’s preconditions is easy since the machines MNSu are polynomial-time (see
Section 3.4). Finally, the integrity preservation theorem from [12] and (2) imply for every
integrity requirement Req that
(SysNS,id |=poly Req) ⇒ (SysNS,real |=poly Req). (3)
Hence if we prove SysNS,id |=perf ReqEA, we immediately obtain SysNS,real |=poly ReqEA.
6 Proof in the Ideal Setting
This section contains the proof of the ideal part of Theorem 4.1: We prove that the Needham-
Schroeder-Lowe protocol implemented with the ideal, Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library
perfectly fulfils the integrity requirement ReqEA. The proof idea is to go backwards in the
protocol step by step, and to show that a specific output always requires a specific prior input.
For instance, when user v successfully terminates a protocol with user u, then u has sent the
third protocol message to v; thus v has sent the second protocol message to u; and so on. The
main challenge in this proof was to find suitable invariants on the state of the ideal Needham-
Schroeder-Lowe system.
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We start this section with a rigorous definition of the possible states of the ideal crypto-
graphic library as needed for formulating the invariants. We then define the invariants and
prove the overall entity authentication requirement from the invariants. Finally we prove the
invariants, after describing the detailed state transitions of the ideal cryptographic library as
needed in that proof.
6.1 Overview and States of the Ideal Cryptographic Library
The ideal cryptographic library administrates Dolev-Yao-style terms and allows each user to
operate on them via handles, i.e., via local names specific to this user. The handles also contain
the information that knowledge sets give in other Dolev-Yao formalizations: The set of terms
that a participant u knows, including u = a for the adversary, is the set of terms with a handle
for u. As we saw in the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe algorithms, the library offers its user (and the
adversary) the typical operations on terms to which they have handles, e.g., encryption with
a public key and decryption with a secret key. The terms are typed; for instance, decryption
only succeeds on ciphertexts and projection only on lists. As secure encryption schemes are
necessarily probabilistic, and as the library allows the generation of polynomially many nonces
and key pairs, multiple instances of terms of almost every structure can occur, e.g., multiple
encryptions of the same messagem with the same key pke. There are multiple ways to deal with
this in prior Dolev-Yao models, e.g., counting (for nonces) and multisets. The version in [25]
corresponds to counting: The terms are globally numbered by a so-called index. Each term is
represented by its type (i.e., root node) and its first-level arguments, which can be indices of
earlier terms. This enables easy distinction of, e.g., which of many nonces is encrypted in a
larger term. These global indices are never visible at the user interface. The indices and the
handles for each participant are generated by one counter each.
A novel aspect of this cryptographic library compared with prior Dolev-Yao models is that
terms have an abstract length parameter, indicating the length of the corresponding real mes-
sage. It is derived from a tuple L of length functions that denote how the length of a term
depends on the length of its subterms. This is necessary because real encryption cannot entirely
hide the length of cleartexts. Moreover, L contains bounds on the accepted message lengths
and the number of accepted inputs at each port. All these bounds can be arbitrary, except
that they must be polynomially bounded in a security parameter k. Formally, the number n of
participants and the tuple L are parameters of the system Syscry,id, but we omitted them for
readability.
Similarly, n and a tuple L′ should be parameters of our ideal Needham-Schroeder-Lowe
system SysNS,id, see Section 3.4. As the machines MNSu of this system only make bounded-
length inputs to the cryptographic library given n and L′, the bounds in L can easily be chosen
large enough so that all these inputs are legal. Further, as we only prove an integrity property,
it is not a problem in the proof that the number of accepted inputs might be exceeded. This is
why we can omit the details of the length functions.
As described above, the terms in the ideal cryptographic library, i.e., in the trusted host
THH for every set H of honest participants, are represented by their top level, and knowledge
of them by potential handles for the different participants. The data structure chosen for this
in [25] is a database D. Generally, a database D is a set of functions, called entries, each over
a finite domain called attributes. For an entry x ∈ D, the value at an attribute att is written
x.att . For a predicate pred involving attributes, D[pred ] means the subset of entries whose
attributes fulfill pred . If D[pred ] contains only one element, we use the same notation for this
element. Adding an entry x to D is abbreviated D :⇐ x. Further, we write the list operation
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as l := (x1, . . . , xj), and the arguments are unambiguously retrievable as l[i], with l[i] = ↓ if
i > j.
In our case, each entry x in D can have the arguments
(ind , type , arg , hndu1 , . . . , hndum, hnd a, len),
where H = {u1, . . . , um} and the arguments have the following types and meaning:
• x.ind is the global index of an entry. Its type INDS is isomorphic to N and distinguishes
index arguments from others. The index is used as a primary key attribute of the database,
i.e., we write D[i] for the selection D[ind = i].
• x.type ∈ typeset identifies the type of x. The types nonce, list, data (for payload data),
ske and pke (for secret and public encryption keys), and enc (for encryptions) occur in the
following.
• x.arg = (a1, a2, . . . , aj) is a possibly empty list of arguments. Arguments of type INDS
are indices of other entries (subterms); we sometimes distinguish them by a superscript
“ind”.
• x.hndu ∈ HNDS ∪ {↓} for u ∈ H ∪ {a} are handles, where x.hndu = ↓ means that u
does not know this entry and HNDS is another set isomorphic to N. We always use a
superscript “hnd” for handles.
• x.len ∈ N0 denotes the length of the entry.
The machine THH has a counter size ∈ INDS for the current size of D and counters
curhndu (current handle) for the handles, all initialized with 0.
The assumption that keys have already been generated and distributed (Section 3.2) means
that for each user u ∈ H two entries of the following form are added to D:
(skeu , type := ske, arg := (), hndu := ske
hnd
u , len := 0);
(pkeu , type := pke, arg := (), hndu1 := pke
hnd
u,u1
, . . . ,
hndum := pke
hnd
u,um
, hnd a := pke
hnd
u,a , len := pke len
∗(k)).
Here skeu and pkeu are two consecutive natural numbers and pke len
∗ is the length function
for public keys. Treating the secret key length as 0 is a technicality in [25] and will not matter
here.
6.2 Invariants
This section contains invariants of the system SysNS,id, which are used in the proof of The-
orem 4.1. The first invariants, correct nonce owner and unique nonce use, are easily proved
and essentially state that handles contained in a set Nonceu,v indeed point to entries of type
nonce, and that no nonce is in two such sets. The next two invariants, nonce secrecy and
nonce-list secrecy, deal with the secrecy of certain terms. They are mainly needed to prove the
last invariant, correct list owner, which establishes who created certain terms.
• Correct Nonce Owner. For all u ∈ H, v ∈ {1, . . . , n} and xhnd ∈ Nonceu,v, we have
D[hndu = x
hnd].type = nonce.
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• Unique Nonce Use. For all u, v ∈ H, all w,w′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and all j ≤ size: IfD[j].hndu ∈
Nonceu,w and D[j].hndv ∈ Noncev,w′ , then (u,w) = (v,w
′).
Nonce secrecy states that the nonces exchanged between honest users u and v remain secret
from all other users and from the adversary, i.e., that the other users and the adversary have
no handles to such a nonce:
• Nonce Secrecy. For all u, v ∈ H and all j ≤ size: If D[j].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v then
D[j].hndw = ↓ for all w ∈ (H ∪ {a}) \ {u, v}.
Similarly, the invariant nonce-list secrecy states that a list containing such a nonce can only
be known to u and v. Further, it states that the identity fields in such lists are correct for
Needham-Schroeder-Lowe messages. Moreover, if such a list is an argument of another entry,
then this entry is an encryption with the public key of u or v.
• Nonce-List Secrecy. For all u, v ∈ H and all j ≤ size with D[j].type = list: Let x indi :=
D[j].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3. If D[x indi ].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v then:
a) D[j].hndw = ↓ for all w ∈ (H ∪ {a}) \ {u, v}.
b) If D[x indi+1].type = data, then D[x
ind
i+1].arg = (u).
c) For all k ≤ size we have j ∈ D[k].arg only if D[k].type = enc and D[k].arg [1] ∈
{pkeu, pkev}.
The invariant correct list owner states that certain protocol messages can only be constructed
by the “intended” users. For instance, if a database entry is structured like the cleartext of a
first protocol message, i.e., it is of type list, its first argument belongs to the set Nonceu,v, and
its second argument is non-cryptographic, i.e., of type data, then it has been created by user u.
Similar statements exist for the second and third protocol message.
• Correct List Owner. For all u, v ∈ H and all j ≤ size with D[j].type = list: Let x indi :=
D[j].arg [i] and xhndi,u := D[x
ind
i ].hndu for i = 1, 2.
a) If xhnd1,u ∈ Nonceu,v andD[x
ind
2 ].type = data, thenD[j] was created byM
NS
u in Step 1.4.
b) If D[x ind1 ].type = nonce and x
hnd
2,u ∈ Nonceu,v, then D[j] was created by M
NS
u in
Step 2.12.
c) If xhnd1,u ∈ Nonceu,v and x
ind
2 = ↓, then D[j] was created by M
NS
v in Step 2.21.
This invariant is key for proceeding backwards in the protocol. For instance, if v terminates a
protocol with user u, then v must have received a third protocol message. Correct list owner
implies that this message has been generated by u. Now u only constructs such a message if it
received a second protocol message. Applying the invariant two more times shows that u indeed
started a protocol with v. The proof described below will take care of the details. Formally,
the invariance of the above statements is captured in the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1 The statements correct nonce owner, unique nonce use, nonce secrecy, nonce-list
secrecy, and correct list owner are invariants of SysNS,id, i.e., they hold at all times in all runs
of {MNSu | u ∈ H} ∪ {THH} for all H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. ✷
The proof is postponed to Section 6.5.
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6.3 Entity Authentication Proof
To increase readability, we partition the proof into several steps with explanations in between.
Assume that u, v ∈ H and that MNSv outputs (ok, u) to its user, i.e., a protocol between u and
v has terminated successfully. We first show that this implies that MNSv has received a message
corresponding to the third protocol step, i.e., of the form that allows us to apply correct list
owner to show that it was created by MNSv . The following property of THH proven in [25] will
be useful in this proof to show that properties proven for one time also hold at another time.
Lemma 6.2 In the ideal cryptographic library Syscry,id, the only modifications to existing en-
tries x in D are assignments to previously undefined attributes x.hndu (except for counter
updates in entries for signature keys, which we do not have to consider here). ✷
Proof. (Ideal part of Theorem 4.1) Assume that MNSv outputs (ok, u) at EA outv ! for u, v ∈ H
at time t4. By definition of Algorithms 1 and 2, this can only happen if there was an input
(u, v, i,m3
hnd
v ) at outv? at a time t3 < t4. Here and in the sequel we use the notation of
Algorithm 2, but we distinguish the variables from its different executions by a superscript
indicating the number of the (claimed) received protocol message, here 3, and give handles an
additional subscript for their owner, here v.
The execution of Algorithm 2 for this input must have given l3
hnd
v 6= ↓ in Step 2.2, since
it would otherwise abort by Convention 1 without creating an output. Let l3
ind
:= D[hndv =
l3
hnd
v ].ind . The algorithm further implies D[l
3ind].type = list. Let x3i
ind
:= D[l3
ind
].arg [i] for
i = 1, 2 at the time of Step 2.3. By definition of list proj and since the condition of Step 2.25 is
true immediately after Step 2.3, we have
x3
hnd
1,v = D[x
3
1
ind
].hndv at time t4 (4)
and
x3
hnd
1,v ∈ Noncev,u ∧ x
3
2
ind
= ↓ at time t4, (5)
since x3
hnd
2,v = ↓ after Step 2.3 implies x
3
2
ind
= ↓.
This first part of the proof shows that MNSv has received a list corresponding to a third protocol
message. Now we apply correct list owner to the list entry D[l3
ind
] to show that this entry
was created by MNSu . Then we show that M
NS
u only generates such an entry if it has received
a second protocol message. To show that this message contains a nonce from v, as needed for
the next application of correct list owner, we exploit the fact that v accepts the same value as
its nonce in the third message, which we know from the first part of the proof.
Proof. (cont’d with 3rd message) Equations (4) and (5) are the preconditions for Part c) of
correct list owner. Hence the entry D[l3
ind
] was created by MNSu in Step 2.21.
This algorithm execution must have started with an input (w, u, i,m2
hnd
u ) at outu? at a time
t2 < t3 with w 6= u. As above, we conclude l
2 hnd
u 6= ↓ in Step 2.2, set l
2ind := D[hndu = l
2 hnd
u ].ind ,
and obtain D[l2
ind
].type = list. Let x2i
ind
:= D[l2
ind
].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3 at the time of Step
2.3. As the condition of Step 2.16 is true immediately afterwards, we obtain x2
hnd
i,u 6= ↓ for
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The definition of list proj and Lemma 6.2 imply
x2
hnd
i,u = D[x
2
i
ind
].hndu for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} at time t4. (6)
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Step 2.18 ensures x23 = w and x
2 hnd
1,u ∈ Nonceu,w. Thus correct nonce owner implies
D[x21
ind
].type = nonce. (7)
Now we exploit that MNSu creates the entry D[l
3ind] in Step 2.21 with the input list(x2
hnd
2,u ). With
the definitions of list and list proj this implies x22
ind
= x31
ind
. Thus Equations (4) and (5) imply
D[x22
ind
].hndv ∈ Noncev,u at time t4. (8)
We have now shown that MNSu has received a list corresponding to the second protocol message.
We apply correct list owner to show that MNSv created this list, and again we can show that
this can only happen if MNSv received a suitable first protocol message. Further, the next part
of the proof shows that w = v and thus MNSu got the second protocol message from M
NS
v , which
remained open in the previous proof part.
Proof. (cont’d with 2nd message) Equations (6) to (8) are the preconditions for Part b) of
correct list owner. Thus the entry D[l2
ind
] was created by MNSv in Step 2.12. The construction
of this entry in Steps 2.11 and 2.12 implies x23 = v and hence w = v (using the definitions of store
and retrieve, and list and list proj). With the results from before Equation (7) and Lemma 6.2
we therefore obtain
x23 = v ∧ x
2 hnd
1,u ∈ Nonceu,v at time t4. (9)
The algorithm execution where MNSv creates the entry D[l
2ind] must have started with an
input (w′, v, i,m1
hnd
v ) at outv? at a time t1 < t2 with w
′ 6= v. As above, we conclude l1
hnd
v 6= ↓
in Step 2.2, set l1
ind
:= D[hndv = l
1 hnd
v ].ind , and obtain D[l
1ind].type = list. Let x1i
ind
:=
D[l1
ind
].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3 at the time of Step 2.3. As the condition of Step 2.4 is true, we
obtain x1
hnd
i,v 6= ↓ for i ∈ {1, 2}. Then the definition of list proj and Lemma 6.2 yield
x1
hnd
i,v = D[x
1
i
ind
].hndv for i ∈ {1, 2} at time t4. (10)
When MNSv creates the entry D[l
2ind] in Step 2.12, its input is list(x1
hnd
1,v , n
hnd
v , v
hnd). This
implies x11
ind
= x21
ind
(as above). Thus Equations (6) and (9) imply
D[x11
ind
].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v at time t4. (11)
The test in Step 2.6 ensures that x12 = w
′ 6= ↓. This implies D[x12
ind
].type = data by the
definition of retrieve, and therefore with Lemma 6.2,
D[x12
ind
].type = data at time t4. (12)
We finally apply correct list owner again to show that MNSu has generated this list corresponding
to a first protocol message. We then show that this message must have been intended for user
v, and thus user u has indeed started a protocol with user v.
Proof. (cont’d with 1st message) Equations (10) to (12) are the preconditions for Part a) of
correct list owner. Thus the entry D[l1
ind
] was created by MNSu in Step 1.4. The construction
of this entry in Steps 1.3 and 1.4 implies x12 = u and hence w
′ = u.
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The execution of Algorithm 1 must have started with an input (new prot, w′′) at EA inu? at
a time t0 < t1. We have to show w
′′ = v. When MNSu creates the entry D[l
1ind] in Step 1.4, its
input is list(nhndu , u
hnd) with nhndu 6= ↓. Hence the definition of list proj implies D[x
1
1
ind
].hndu =
nhndu ∈ Nonceu,w′′ . With Equation (11) and unique nonce use we conclude w
′′ = v.
In a nutshell, we have shown that for all times t4 where M
NS
v outputs (ok, u) at EA outv !,
there exists a time t0 < t4 such that M
NS
u receives an input (new prot, v) at EA inu? at time t0.
This proves Theorem 4.1.
6.4 Command Evaluation by the Ideal Cryptographic Library
This section contains the definition of the cryptographic commands used for modeling the
Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol, and the local adversary commands that model the extended
capabilities of the adversary as far as needed to prove the invariants. Recall that we deal with
top levels of Dolev-Yao-style terms, and that commands typically create a new term with its
index, type, arguments, handles, and length functions, or parse an existing term. We present
the full definitions of the commands, but the reader can ignore the length functions, which have
names x len. By x := y++ for integer variables x, y we mean y := y +1;x := y. The length of a
message m is denoted as len(m).
Each input c at a port inu? with u ∈ H ∪ {a} should be a list (cmd , x1, . . . , xj) with
cmd from a fixed list of commands and certain parameter domains. We usually write it
y ← cmd(x1, . . . , xj) with a variable y designating the result that THH returns at outu !. The
algorithm ihnd := ind2hndu(i) (with side effect) denotes that THH determines a handle i
hnd
for user u to an entry D[i]: If ihnd := D[i].hndu 6= ↓, it returns that, else it sets and returns
ihnd := D[i].hndu := curhndu++. On non-handles, it is the identity function. The function
ind2hnd∗u applies ind2hndu to each element of a list.
In the following definitions, we assume that a cryptographic command is input at port inu?
with u ∈ H∪{a}. First, we describe the commands for storing and retrieving data via handles.
• Storing: mhnd ← store(m), for m ∈ {0, 1}max len(k).
If i := D[type = data ∧ arg = (m)].ind 6= ↓ then return mhnd := ind2hndu(i). Otherwise if
data len∗(len(m)) > max len(k) return ↓. Else set mhnd := curhndu++ and
D :⇐ (ind := size++, type := data, arg := (m),
hndu := m
hnd, len := data len∗(len(m))).
• Retrieval: m← retrieve(mhnd).
m := D[hndu = m
hnd ∧ type = data].arg [1].
Next we describe list creation and projection. Lists cannot include secret keys of the public-key
systems (entries of type ske, sks) because no information about those must be given away.
• Generate a list: lhnd ← list(xhnd1 , . . . , x
hnd
j ), for 0 ≤ j ≤ max len(k).
Let xi := D[hndu = x
hnd
i ].ind for i = 1, . . . , j. If anyD[xi].type ∈ {sks, ske}, set l
hnd := ↓.If
l := D[type = list ∧ arg = (x1, . . . , xj)].ind 6= ↓, then return l
hnd := ind2hndu(l). Other-
wise, set length := list len∗(D[x1].len, . . . ,D[xj ].len) and return ↓ if length > max len(k).
Else set lhnd := curhndu++ and
D :⇐ (ind := size++, type := list, arg := (x1, . . . ,
xj), hndu := l
hnd, len := length).
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• i-th projection: xhnd ← list proj(lhnd, i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ max len(k).
If D[hndu = l
hnd ∧ type = list].arg = (x1, . . . , xj) with j ≥ i, then x
hnd := ind2hndu(xi),
otherwise xhnd := ↓.
The abstract command to create a fresh nonce simply creates a new entry in D.
• Generate a nonce: nhnd ← gen nonce().
Set nhnd := curhndu++ and
D :⇐ (ind := size++, type := nonce, arg := (),
hndu := n
hnd, len := nonce len∗(k)).
Further, we used commands to encrypt and decrypt a list.
• Encryption: chnd ← encrypt(pkhnd, lhnd).
Let pk := D[hndu = pk
hnd ∧ type = pke].ind and l := D[hndu = l
hnd ∧ type = list].ind and
length := enc len∗(k,D[l].len). If length > max len(k) or pk = ↓ or l = ↓, then return ↓.
Else set chnd := curhndu++ and
D :⇐ (ind := size++, type := enc, arg := (pk , l),
hndu := c
hnd, len := length).
• Decryption: lhnd ← decrypt(skhnd, chnd).
Let sk := D[hndu = sk
hnd ∧ type = ske].ind and c := D[hndu = c
hnd ∧ type = enc].ind .
Return ↓ if c = ↓ or sk = ↓ or pk := D[c].arg [1] 6= sk + 1 or l := D[c].arg [2] = ↓. Else
return lhnd := ind2hndu(l).
From the set of local adversary commands, which capture additional commands for the
adversary at port ina?, we only describe the command adv parse. It allows the adversary to
retrieve all information that we do not explicitly require to be hidden. This command returns
the type and usually all the abstract arguments of a value (with indices replaced by handles),
except in the case of ciphertexts. About the remaining local adversary commands, we only need
to know that they do not output handles to already existing entries of type list or nonce.
• Parameter retrieval: (type , arg)← adv parse(mhnd).
Let m := D[hnd a = m
hnd].ind and type := D[m].type . In most cases, set arg :=
ind2hnd∗a(D[m].arg). (Recall that this only transforms arguments in INDS.) The
only exception is for type = enc and D[m].arg of the form (pk , l) (a valid cipher-
text) and D[pk − 1].hnd a = ↓ (the adversary does not know the secret key); then
arg := (ind2hnda(pk ),D[l].len).
We finally describe the commands for sending messages on insecure channels. In the second
one, the adversary sends list l to v, pretending to be u.
• send i(v, lhnd), for v ∈ {1, . . . , n} at port inu? for u ∈ H.
Let l ind := D[hndu = l
hnd ∧ type = list].ind . If l ind 6= ↓, then output (u, v, i, ind2hnda(l ind))
at outa!.
• adv send i(u, v, lhnd), for u ∈ {1, . . . , n} and v ∈ H at port ina?.
Let l ind := D[hnd a = l
hnd ∧ type = list].ind . If l ind 6= ↓, output (u, v, i, ind2hndv(l
ind)) at
outv !.
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6.5 Proof of the Invariants
We start with the proof of correct nonce owner.
Proof. (Correct nonce owner) Let xhnd ∈ Nonceu,v for u ∈ H and v ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By construc-
tion, xhnd has been added to Nonceu,v by M
NS
u in Step 1.2 or Step 2.10. In both cases, x
hnd has
been generated by the command gen nonce() at some time t, input at port inu? of THH. Con-
vention 1 implies xhnd 6= ↓, as MNSu would abort otherwise and not add x
hnd to the set Nonceu,v.
The definition of gen nonce then implies D[hndu = x
hnd] 6= ↓ and D[hndu = x
hnd].type = nonce
at time t. Because of Lemma 6.2 this also holds at all later times t′ > t, which finishes the
proof.
The following proof of unique nonce use is quite similar.
Proof. (Unique Nonce Use) Assume for contradiction that both D[j].hndu ∈ Nonceu,w and
D[j].hndv ∈ Noncev,w′ at some time t. Without loss of generality, let t be the first such time
and let D[j].hndv 6∈ Noncev,w′ at time t − 1. By construction, D[j].hndv is thus added to
Noncev,w′ at time t by Step 1.2 or Step 2.10. In both cases, D[j].hndv has been generated
by the command gen nonce() at time t − 1. The definition of gen nonce implies that D[j] is a
new entry and D[j].hndv its only handle at time t − 1, and thus also at time t. With correct
nonce owner this implies u = v. Further, Noncev,w′ is the only set into which the new handle
D[j].hndv is put at times t− 1 and t. Thus also w = w
′. This is a contradiction.
In the following, we prove correct list owner, nonce secrecy, and nonce-list secrecy by in-
duction. Hence we assume that all three invariants hold at a particular time t in a run of the
system, and show that they still hold at time t+ 1.
Proof. (Correct list owner) Let u, v ∈ H, j ≤ size with D[j].type = list. Let x indi := D[j].arg [i]
and xhndi,u := D[x
ind
i ].hndu for i = 1, 2 and assume that x
hnd
i,u ∈ Nonceu,v for i = 1 or i = 2 at
time t+ 1.
The only possibilities to violate the invariant correct list owner are that (1) the entry D[j]
is created at time t + 1 or that (2) the handle D[j].hndu is created at time t + 1 for an entry
D[j] that already exists at time t or that (3) the handle xhndi,u is added to Nonceu,v at time t+1.
In all other cases the invariant holds by the induction hypothesis and Lemma 6.2.
We start with the third case. Assume that xhndi,u is added to Nonceu,v at time t + 1. By
construction, this only happens in a transition of MNSu in Step 1.2 and Step 2.10. However, here
the entry D[x indi ] has been generated by the command gen nonce input at inu? at time t, hence
x indi cannot be contained as an argument of an entry D[j] at time t. Formally, this corresponds
to the fact that D is well-formed, i.e., index arguments of an entry are always smaller than the
index of the entry itself; this has been shown in [25]. Since a transition of MNSu does not modify
entries in THH, this also holds at time t+ 1.
For proving the remaining two cases, assume that D[j].hndu is created at time t + 1 for
an already existing entry D[j] or that D[j] is generated at time t + 1. Because both can
only happen in a transition of THH, this implies x
hnd
i,u ∈ Nonceu,v already at time t, since
transitions of THH cannot modify the set Nonceu,v. Because of u, v ∈ H, nonce secrecy implies
D[x indi ].hndw 6= ↓ only if w ∈ {u, v}. Lists can only be constructed by the basic command list,
which requires handles to all its elements. More precisely, if w ∈ H ∪ {a} creates an entry
D[j′] with D[j′].type = list and (x′1, . . . , x
′
k) := D[j].arg at time t+ 1 then D[x
′
i].hndw 6= ↓ for
i = 1, . . . , k already at time t. Applied to the entry D[j], this implies that either u or v have
created the entry D[j].
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We now only have to show that the entry D[j] has been created by u in the claimed steps.
This can easily be seen by inspection of Algorithms 1 and 2. We only show it in detail for the
first part of the invariant; it can be proven similarly for the remaining two parts.
Let xhnd1,u ∈ Nonceu,v and D[x
ind
2 ].type = data. By inspection of Algorithms 1 and 2 and
because D[j].type = list, we see that the entry D[j] must have been created by either MNSu
or MNSv in Step 1.4. (The remaining list generation commands either only have one element,
which implies x ind2 = ↓ and hence D[x
ind
2 ].type 6= data, or we have D[x
ind
2 ].type = nonce by
construction.) Now assume for contradiction that the entry D[j] has been generated by MNSv .
This implies that also the entry D[x ind1 ] has been newly generated by the command gen nonce
input at inv?. However, only M
NS
u can add a handle to the set Nonceu,v (it is the local state of
MNSu ), but every nonce that M
NS
u adds to the set Nonceu,v is newly generated by the command
gen nonce input by MNSu by construction. This implies x
hnd
1,u 6∈ Nonceu,v at all times, which
yields a contradiction to xhnd1,u ∈ Nonceu,v at time t+1. Hence D[j] has been created by user u.
Proof. (Nonce secrecy) Let u, v ∈ H, j ≤ size with D[j].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v, and w ∈ (H ∪
{a}) \ {u, v} be given. Because of correct nonce owner, we know that D[j].type = nonce. The
invariant could only be affected if (1) the handle D[j].hndu is put into the set Nonceu,v at time
t+ 1 or (2) if a handle for w is added to the entry D[j] at time t+ 1.
For proving the first case, note that the set Nonceu,v is only extended by a handle n
hnd
u by
MNSu in Steps 1.2 and 2.10. In both cases, n
hnd
u has been generated by THH at time t since
the command gen nonce was input at inu? at time t. The definition of gen nonce immediately
implies that D[j].hndw = ↓ at time t if w 6= u. Moreover, this also holds at time t+ 1 since a
transition of MNSu does not modify handles in THH, which finishes the claim for this case.
For proving the second case, we only have to consider those commands that add handles for
w to entries of type nonce. These are only the commands list proj or adv parse input at inw?,
where adv parse has to be applied to an entry of type list, since only entries of type list can have
arguments which are indices to nonce entries. More precisely, if one of the commands violated
the invariant there would exist an entry D[i] at time t such that D[i].type = list, D[i].hndw 6= ↓
and j ∈ (x ind1 , . . . , x
ind
m ) := D[i].arg . However, both commands do not modify the set Nonceu,v,
hence we have D[j].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v already at time t. Now nonce secrecy yields D[j].hndw = ↓
at time t and hence also at all times < t because of Lemma 6.2. This implies that the entry
D[i] must have been created by either u or v, since generating a list presupposes handles for
all elements (cf. the previous proof). Assume without loss of generality that D[i] has been
generated by u. By inspection of Algorithms 1 and 2, this immediately implies j ∈ (x ind1 , x
ind
2 ),
since handles to nonces only occur as first or second element in a list generation by u. Because
of j ∈ D[i].arg [1, 2] and D[j].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v at time t, nonce-list secrecy for the entry D[i]
implies that D[i].hndw = ↓ at time t. This yields a contradiction.
Proof. (Nonce-list secrecy) Let u, v ∈ H, j ≤ size with D[j].type = list. Let x indi := D[j].arg [i]
and xhndi,u := D[x
ind
i ].hndu for i = 1, 2, and w ∈ (H∪ {a}) \ {u, v}. Let x
hnd
i,u ∈ Nonceu,v for i = 1
or i = 2.
We first show that the invariant cannot be violated by adding the handle xhndi,u to Nonceu,v
at time t + 1. This can only happen in a transition of MNSu in Step 1.2 or 2.10. As shown in
the proof of correct list owner, the entry D[x indi ] has been generated by THH at time t. Since
D is well-formed, this implies that x indi 6∈ D[j].arg for all entries D[j] that already exist at time
t. This also holds for all entries at time t + 1, since the transition of MNSu does not modify
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entries of THH. This yields a contradiction to x
ind
i = D[j].arg [i]. Hence we now know that
xhndi,u ∈ Nonceu,v already holds at time t.
Part a) of the invariant can only be affected if a handle for w is added to an entry D[j] that
already exists at time t. (Creation of D[j] at time t with a handle for w is impossible as above
because that presupposes handles to all arguments, in contradiction to nonce secrecy.) The
only commands that add new handles for w to existing entries of type list are list proj, decrypt,
adv parse, send i, and adv send i applied to an entry D[k] with j ∈ D[k].arg . Nonce-list secrecy
for the entry D[j] at time t then yields D[k].type = enc. Thus the commands list proj, send i,
and adv send i do not have to be considered any further. Moreover, nonce-list secrecy also yields
D[k].arg [1] ∈ {pkeu, pkev}. The secret keys of u and v are not known to w 6∈ {u, v}, formally
D[hndw = ske
hnd
u ] = D[hndw = ske
hnd
v ] = ↓; this corresponds to the invariant key secrecy of [25].
Hence the command decrypt does not violate the invariant. Finally, the command adv parse
applied to an entry of type enc with unknown secret key also does not give a handle to the
cleartext list, i.e., to D[k].arg [2], but only outputs its length.
Part b) of the invariant can only be affected if the list entry D[j] is created at time t+ 1.
(By well-formedness, the argument entry D[x indi+1] cannot be created after D[j].) As in Part a),
it can only be created by a party w ∈ {u, v} because other parties have no handle to the nonce
argument. Inspection of Algorithms 1 and 2 shows that this can only happen in Steps 1.4 and
2.12, because all other commands list have only one argument, while our preconditions imply
x ind2 6= ↓.
• If the creation is in Step 1.4, the preceding Step 1.2 implies D[x ind1 ].hndw ∈ Noncew,w′
for some w′ and Step 1.3 implies D[x ind2 ].type = data. Thus the preconditions of Part b)
of the invariant can only hold for i = 1, and thus D[x ind1 ].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v. Now unique
nonce use implies u = w. Thus Steps 1.3 and 1.4 yield D[x ind2 ].arg = (u).
• If the creation is in Step 2.12, the preceding steps 2.10 and 2.11 imply that the precondi-
tions of Part b) of the invariant can only hold for i = 2. Then the precondition, Step 2.10,
and unique nonce use imply u = w. Finally, Steps 2.11 and 2.12 yield D[x ind3 ].arg = (u).
Part c) of the invariant can only be violated if a new entry D[k] is created at time t + 1
with j ∈ D[k].arg (by Lemma 6.2 and well-formedness). As D[j] already exists at time t,
nonce-list secrecy for D[j] implies D[j].hndw = ↓ for w 6∈ {u, v} at time t. We can easily see
by inspection of the commands that the new entry D[k] must have been created by one of the
commands list and encrypt (or by sign, which creates a signature), since entries newly created
by other commands cannot have arguments that are indices of entries of type list. Since all
these commands entered at a port inz ? presuppose D[j].hndz 6= ↓, the entry D[k] is created by
w ∈ {u, v} at time t+1. However, the only steps that can create an entry D[k] with j ∈ D[k].arg
(with the properties demanded for the entry D[j]) are Steps 1.5, 2.13, and 2.22. In all these
cases, we have D[k].type = enc. Further, we have D[k].arg [1] = pkew′ where w
′ denotes w’s
current believed partner. We have to show that w′ ∈ {u, v}.
• Case 1: D[k] is created in Step 1.5. By inspection of Algorithm 1, we see that the
precondition of this proof can only be fulfilled for i = 1. Then D[x ind1 ].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v
and D[x ind1 ].hndw ∈ Noncew,w′ and unique nonce use imply w
′ = v.
• Case 2: D[k] is created in Step 2.13, and i = 2. Then D[x ind2 ].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v and
D[x ind2 ].hndw ∈ Noncew,w′ and unique nonce use imply w
′ = v.
• Case 3: D[k] is created in Step 2.13, and i = 1. This execution of Algorithm 2 must give
lhnd 6= ↓ in Step 2.2, since it would otherwise abort by Convention 1. Let lind := D[hndw =
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lhnd].ind . The algorithm further implies D[lind].type = list. Let x0i
ind
:= D[lind].arg [i] for
i = 1, 2, 3 at the time of Step 2.3, and let x0
hnd
i,w be the handles obtained in Step 2.3.
As the algorithm does not abort in Steps 2.5 and 2.7, we have D[x02
ind
].type = data and
D[x02
ind
].arg = (w′).
Further, the reuse of x0
hnd
1,w in Step 2.12 implies x
0
1
ind
= x ind1 . Together with the precondi-
tion D[x ind1 ].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v, the entry D[l
ind] therefore fulfills the conditions of Part b)
of nonce-list secrecy with i = 1. This implies D[x02
ind
].arg = (u), and thus w′ = u.
• Case 4: D[k] is created in Step 2.22. With Step 2.21, this implies x ind2 = ↓ and thus
i = 1. As in Case 3, this execution of Algorithm 2 must give lhnd 6= ↓ in Step 2.2, we set
lind := D[hndw = l
hnd].ind , and we have D[lind].type = list. Let x0i
ind
:= D[lind].arg [i] for
i = 1, 2, 3 at the time of Step 2.3, and let x0
hnd
i,w be the handles obtained in Step 2.3. As
the algorithm does not abort in Steps 2.17 and 2.19, we have D[x03
ind
].type = data and
D[x03
ind
].arg = (w′).
Further, the reuse of x0
hnd
2,w in Step 2.21 implies x
0
2
ind
= x ind1 . Together with the precondi-
tion D[x ind1 ].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v, the entry D[l
ind] therefore fulfills the condition of Part b)
of nonce-list secrecy with i = 2. This implies D[x03
ind
].arg = (u), and thus w′ = u.
Hence in all cases we obtained w′ = u, i.e., the list containing the nonce was indeed encrypted
with the key of an honest participant.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol is secure in the real cryp-
tographic setting. This was done via a proof over a Dolev-Yao-style deterministic idealization
of cryptography which has a provably secure real cryptographic implementation. Composition
and integrity preservation theorems from the underlying model imply that the protocol proof
with the idealized cryptography carries over to the real protocol implementation. This was
the first example of such a proof. In spite of certain differences to usual Dolev-Yao variants,
in particular a representation of terms or real cryptographic objects to the protocol layer by
handles (local names) and length functions in the idealization, the proof seems to be of a type
readily accessible to automatic proof tools. We therefore hope that our hand-made proof paves
the way towards automated, cryptographically sound proofs of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe
protocol and many other security protocols. In fact, we have executed our proof technical
to obtain computational sound guarantees for further protocols [21, 7, 23, 15] and for more
comprehensive security guarantees [6].
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